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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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| Sommerville, Matthew M.; Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London; m.sommerville06@imperial.ac.uk; Jones, Julia P. G.; School of Environment and Natural Resources, University of Bangor; julia.jones@bangor.ac.uk; Milner-Gulland, E. J.; Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London; e.j.milner-gulland@imperial.ac.uk. |
| Over the past decade, “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) have received a great deal of attention as a natural-resource management approach. We propose a revised definition and framework for PES implementation that focuses on the use of positive incentives as the philosophy behind PES and conditionality as the method for influencing behaviors. We note the importance of additionality of PES interventions to justify their value in a wider context. Finally, we highlight the need to understand the local institutional context in terms of the characteristics of buyers, sellers, and their relationship for implementation to be effective. Our framework acts as a platform to begin examining how the variety of options for structuring PES... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Insight |
Palavras-chave: Additionality; Conditional; Ecosystem services; Environmental management; Incentives; Institutions; Monitoring; Transactions. |
| Ano: 2009 |
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| Gilmour, Brad; Jotanovic, Aleksandar; Gurung, Rajendra Kumar; Polcyn, Tania; Deng, Hugh. |
| With a relatively small population and 7% of the world's available freshwater resources, Canada is well placed for a world of water scarcity where the real value of water in its many uses becomes more and more apparent. However, action is necessary to ensure that Canada continues to benefit from the social, economic and environmental goods and services derived from water resources. Experience and analysis suggests that policy and incentives play critical roles in the sustainable exploitation of natural resources. In particular, properly valuing water in all its forms and uses appears to be critical. Analysis abroad has underlined the benefits of clearly delineating the roles of regulators, resource managers, infrastructure operators and service... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Water; Governance; Scarcity; Incentives; Sustainability; Valuation; Accountability; Transparency; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Relations/Trade; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46689 |
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| Lee, Myoungki; Wu, Steven Y.; Fan, Maoyong. |
| This study examines legislation that would grant growers termination damages if their contracts are terminated. Our model suggests that, with no contracting frictions, damages would not reduce ex ante efficiency as processors can contract around damages through contract restructuring. Growers would earn less under continuation but would be protected if terminated, although overall expected profits would be unaffected. However, when contracting friction exist, then efficiency losses can occur as processors would be constrained in restructuring contractual incentives to deal with moral hazard. Growers' expected profits would increase while processors' profit would decrease. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contract law; Contract regulation; Damages; Incentives; Principal-agent; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42461 |
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| Cadot, Julien. |
| This research aims at identifying the incentives associated to collaterals in an asymmetric information context and when the bank is the main financial partner of the entrepreneurs, which is typically the case for most farms and especially in the wine sector. In one hand, collaterals may reduce the risk of overinvestment by entrepreneurs and so reduce the risk of repayment default. In the other hand, to contract collaterals may lead the bank to reduce the monitoring effort. In this paper we test these two hypotheses in taking into account the fact that entrepreneurs can benefit from a banking relationship or not. Our results confirm that collaterals’ incentives depend on the bank monitoring. Moreover, this emphasizes the uniqueness of land mortgages.... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Collaterals; Incentives; Bank monitoring; Agricultural Finance; G32; G33; G35. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103414 |
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| Gregg, Daniel; Greiner, Romy. |
| The adoption of conservation practices is a complex matter – rural landholders consider a wide variety of factors and characteristics when deciding whether to adopt a conservation practice. To confound the issue, recent research has suggested that the goals of landholders affect the adoption of conservation practices by creating a subjective consideration of the relative importance of impediments and effectiveness of incentives in the adoption decision. In this research we describe an empirical link between graziers’ goals and their perceptions of the relative importance of impediments and the effectiveness of incentives in the adoption of conservation practices. The research was carried out in the tropical savannas region of Australia where pastoral... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Graziers; Goals; Conservation; Tropical savannas; Impediments; Incentives; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49923 |
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| Olesen, Henrik Ballebye. |
| This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and a large company in the Danish food industry, Danisco Foods. Production of green peas requires a very accurate coordination, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a tournament system providing risk sharing between the farmers. General problems from the contract theory such as hold up, moral hazard, risk sharing and screening are analyzed. The paper illustrates the tradeoffs between these problems in design of contracts. By negotiating the contract through a pea-growers association, the farmers gain some bargaining power. Thus the farmers can ensure that Danisco Foods uses only one contract for all farmers. This paper analyzes the consequences of the farmers'... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Contract theory; Coordination; Incentives; Risk sharing; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24200 |
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| Wale, Edilegnaw; Virchow, Detlef. |
| Crop genetic resources are the building blocks of sustainable agricultural development due to their relevance not only as inputs for variety development but also as indigenous crop insurance mechanisms through traditional variety portfolio management. Their continuous survival is, however, threatened by natural and human driven factors. This threat has induced the need for designing conservation measures. Among the in situ and ex situ conservation options available to conserve crop genetic resources, on-farm conservation has recently attracted enormous attention. To make this option operational, placing incentives (that link conservation with utilization) and removal of perverse incentives are believed to be crucial so that landraces of no immediate... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: On-farm conservation; Sorghum genetic resources; Incentives; Poisson regression; Ethiopia; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25882 |
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| Hyytiainen, Kari; Leppanen, J.; Pahkasalo, T.. |
| Rational land use decisions of private landowners are analysed in the framework of Common Agricultural Policy and other public support schemes effective in Finland in 2003. Net present values are computed for a marginal hectare of a typical Finnish farm. Three alternative land uses are considered: traditional cultivation of oats (Avena sativa L.), cultivation of reed canary grass (Phalaris Arundinacea L.) for energy production, and production of Norway spruce (Picea abies [L.] Karst.) timber. Both arable land and forested land are considered as initial states. Experimental data from 38 afforested stands and distance-independent individual-tree stand growth model are used for computing discounted net returns from forestry. Statistics on market prices,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Common Agricultural Policy; Energy grass; Incentives; Land use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44178 |
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| Kerr, William A.. |
| The European Union is attempting to have the protection of geographic indicators strengthened in the WTO. There may be sufficient rents and other benefits available to justify this strategy in the negotiations. To achieve its rent-seeking goals, however, the European Union needs allies at the negotiations. It has been courting developing countries by touting the benefits of geographic indicators for their products. For most products originating in developing countries, the opportunities for rents will first have to be created, a resource-intensive and problematic activity. Further, even if rents can be created in the short run, the forces of competition are likely to erode them. Scarce resources might be better utilized on other development strategies that... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Developing countries; Geographic indicators; Incentives; Rent seeking; Sustainable development; WTO; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23827 |
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| East, Miriam. |
| In the Mackay Whitsunday region, the dominant grazing based operations are small intensive systems that heavily utilise soil, nutrient and chemical management practices. To improve water quality entering the Great Barrier Reef, graziers are being encouraged to adopt improved management practices. However, while there is good understanding of the management changes required to reach improved practice classification levels, there is poor understanding of the likely economic implications for a grazier seeking to move from a lower level classification to the higher level classifications. This paper provides analysis of the costs and benefits associated with adoption of intensive grazing best management practices to determine the effect on the profitability and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Grazing; Management practices; Incentives; Mackay Whitsunday; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59070 |
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| Simpson, R. David. |
| Placing production units under common ownership is often suggested as a solution to the problem of externalities. This will not always be true when there are decreasing returns to scale. An atomistic industry could be more efficient than a monopoly in some instances. Even when the "optimal" industry configuration would involve a finite number of producers, no two may have appropriate incentives to combine. An omniscient and benign regulator can always assure a more efficient outcome than would result from the combination of private producers. Whether real-world regulators should be called upon, however, is less clear. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externalities; Mergers; Returns to scale; Incentives; Land Economics/Use; L23; Q24. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10457 |
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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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